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Abstract
Development communication theory can be framed as the rescue mission of the global north 
to save the global south from itself. It is in view of this that this paper asks: what does it 
mean to found the emancipation of the postcolonial nation on the philanthropic whim? Us-
ing Derrida’s theory of gift as a framework, this paper opens up discussions around the cost 
of international development assistance on the instrumentality of the postcolonial state as 
an agent of national development. It uses illustrative examples from Ghana and Uganda to 
demonstrate how development aid has transformed the postcolonial state into an instrument 
of tutelary governance, and invites development communication scholars to question the 
discursive and performative functions of international development assistance.
Keywords: development communication, gift, telescopic philanthropy, postcolonial state, 
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Introduction
One obvious way by which countries of the Global South get to become headline news 
in the mainstream developed countries is when there is a bad news like the outbreak of 
war, famine or disease. Africa is notorious for this particular symbolic construction. This 
character of news about the Global South is a well-known feature. What is not well com-
mented on, however, is the second dynamic to this paradigm of doom and gloom, which 
is the heroic Western act of saving Africa from itself. This act of philanthropy has become 
the dominant prism through which Africa gets to make it into the headline news of the 
developed world. Examples abound in the mass media. When Lindsay Lohan and Britney 
Spears who, after suffering from bad press due to their personal mischief, wanted to sal-
vage themselves and their economic fortunes as entertainment celebrities, they announced 
plans to travel to Africa to campaign against poverty and AIDS, even though they prob-
ably would not do so in fact. Madonna is now associated with a non-profit organization, 
“Raising Malawi”, after adopting a child from an orphanage in Malawi. The metaphor of 
the perpetual African child cannot be lost in this. Oprah’s school project in South Africa, 
like Madonna’s adoption story, is difficult to criticize, because doing good, altruism, and 
charity are acts that are almost impossible to challenge. Increasingly, Mr. Paul Hewson 
(alias Bono) is better known for his campaign to save Africa than for his music with the 
band U2. We know that celebrity valuation is based on the economy of image circulation. 
And thus the philanthropic attraction to the poor lies in its difference. 
Plenary II. International Panel on Global Divides
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Lucy Irigary would have said both the celebrities and their object of seduction, the 
poor, are located in a specular economy (Irigaray 1985). It is this economy that I think 
critical scholarship in Development Communication should attend to. For we need to 
answer the question: What comes after giving? The role of the media in the construc-
tion of this second dynamic of telescopic philanthropy has not received much scholarly 
attention as what I have called the paradigm of doom and gloom. Thus this chapter is 
an attempt to draw attention to this aspect of how Africa is repeatedly represented as an 
object of charity and how this has wider ramifications on the emancipatory potential of 
the continent. In a sense, then, this chapter is about a global divide of benefactors and 
beneficiaries, alms givers and beggars, saviors and their helpless objects of heroism.
What does it mean to found the emancipation of a continent on the philanthropic 
whim? It is in the rescuing of the poor, or helping the “undeveloped” to attain what 
Schramm (1964) called the attainment of the “Great Society”, that development com-
munication theory finds its reason d’être as an academic and programmatic area of 
inquiry. Thus we need to problematize the relationship between philanthropy and the 
epistemic foundations of development communication. I will develop an argument 
around the characteristic feature of the Global North as the source of charity and the 
Global South as the object of emancipation, and how this dynamic impacts on the state 
and transforms it into an instrument of tutelary governance. Such a view can be used 
as a framework for rethinking development communication scholarship and the ques-
tion of emancipation. Indeed the project of development communication theory can be 
framed as the rescue mission of the North to save the Global South from itself. Drawing 
from theories of charity, and philanthropy, this paper attempts to open up discussions 
around the limits of altruism and the poverty of development communication theory as 
an emancipatory practice.
From Charles Dickens to Present
“Telescopic philanthropy”, as a phrase, was first used by Charles Dickens in his novel 
Bleak House some 150 years ago to poke fun at and critique what was then an English 
fascination and obsession with designing development projects to save Africa and Af-
ricans from poverty, and to usher them into a modern economy of production. In the 
Dickensian narrative, the story is told of a Mrs. Jellyby, a friend of John Jarndyce, who 
neglects her house and children and is obsessed with projects designed to save African 
in the Congo from poverty by teaching them how to grow coffee to enable them to earn 
an income. In retrospect, it is clear that what Dickens was describing was the genesis of 
what is now a global industry of state, non-governmental charities and celebrity acts of 
philanthropy to save Africa from itself. Dickens was noted for his journalism and the use 
of the novel as a means of social critique. His discussion of telescopic philanthropy is 
instructive because it allows us to understand the practice of international development 
as pre-dating the post-World War II Truman era. It also allows us to understand how 
international development framed as charitable interventions that northern developed 
countries do to global southern countries as acts that are tied to the domestic power 
politics of the so-called benefactor countries. 
It is against this backdrop that I am motivated to argue that the problem with Africa 
is as much a problem of development as it is the troubling impact of international aid 
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on the continent’s self-initiative. Evidently what I am aiming to argue is not about a 
global divide of technological haves and technological have-nots. The global divide that 
interests me is the global divide of benefactors and beneficiaries, that between donors 
and beggars, between philanthropist and objects of charity. The institution that is partly 
responsible for this global divide is the global media. As we have seen from Dickens, the 
attempt to save Africa is not new. Indeed, Susan Thorne’s (1999) provocative interpreta-
tion of 19th Century middle class formation in Victorian and Edwardian Britain makes 
the case that saving the heathens in Africa was always preferred to saving the heathens 
at home, and that this particular fascination with the distant other had a definite impe-
rial logic. It is a logic that is still with us today. I will be coming back to this particular 
angle of the past to relate it to the present.
I have been conducting interviews with retired international development workers 
who were active in the 1960s. And recently I had a chat with SD1 who was instrumental 
in lobbying for the creation of Canada’s International Development Research Centre 
(IDRC). He told me his earliest achievement in the late 1950s was helping to bring 
the first batch of African students to Canada to study. When the first batch arrived, he 
welcomed them and asked what they wanted to do for their first weekend. The African 
students told him they wanted to visit a First Nations Community. He was shocked. 
Shocked because, not only did he not know where they lived, he was not even sure 
whether as a Canadian he was allowed to visit a First Nations Community. Later he found 
out that a First Nations Community was located about five kilometres away from his 
home. He did not know of them until then, but he knew of how to save faraway Africa. 
His neighbours, the First Nations people, probably needed development assistance more 
than the distant Africans did. But saving the distant other has always been the preferred 
practice. Today the theme of telescopic philanthropy as the means of emancipation from 
poverty has taken centre stage in global discourses on Africa. What is interesting, and 
disturbing about this development of the discourse of aid is that there has been a shift 
from state actors to a predominance of private individual and corporate actors. Saving 
Africa has now become the new celebrity public statement. 
It has been some 60 years since international “soft power” was re-articulated in the 
garb of compassion as international development with the proclamation of the Truman 
doctrine (Truman 1964). Sixty years into the present, we know that this model of assist-
ance is a failure. For instance, in 2007, the Senate in Ottawa, an arm of the Canadian 
Government, released an extensive report showing that 40 years of Canada’s develop-
ment assistance through the state agency CIDA has been a dismal failure (Senate of 
Canada 2007). Among others, the Senate Committee recommended, as an option, that 
CIDA be shut down. While this is unlikely to be implemented, it points to the fact that 
institutionalized international development initiated from the developed countries to 
support the development of developing countries is not working.
Action Aid International has been at the forefront of documenting the amount of 
phantom aid in international development assistance. It reports, for instance, that: 
“Eighty-six cents in every dollar of American aid is phantom aid, largely because it 
is so heavily tied to the purchase of US goods and services, and because it is so badly 
targeted at poor countries” (Action Aid 2005 p. 19. See also Action Aid 2006 for a 
follow-up report). The Canadian Senate report stated that since CIDA was created in 
1968, it has spent 12.4 billion dollars in bilateral assistance to sub-Sahara Africa with 
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no demonstrable results. Why should it be surprising? Imagine that 81% of CIDA’s 
1500 employees are based in Ottawa with field staff having no executive authority 
(Senate of Canada 2007).
If we remind ourselves that the original idea of international development assistance 
that the US invented was not about development of the Global South, but about devel-
oping a global instrument of soft power and containment (Samarajiwa 1987, Escobar 
1995), then the epistemic commitment of development communication theory ought to 
question the language of help that characterizes international development. Much of the 
development communication literature of the past 60 years has been on how to become 
an effective handmaiden of this dubious re-invention of international diplomacy called 
international development (See Waisbord 2000 for a comprehensive statement of various 
theoretical, methodological and strategic commitments in the field). Arturo Escobar’s 
(1995) Foucualdian take on development and other post-development theorists are also 
instructive here.
Development communication theory as an area of inquiry needs to take into account 
the price the so-called poor pay when they get a clinic built, pipe-borne water provided 
or a school built through the altruism of the philanthropist, the gift giver, or the new 
missionary worker of international development. I want to use a recent EU decision 
to illustrate this point. In July 2008, the BBC reported that the European Commission 
had agreed to use one billion euros of unspent European farm subsidies to aid African 
farmers (BBC 2008). The BBC report, which showed a picture of an African farmer 
labouring a rice field, went on to quote European Commission president Jose Manuel 
Barroso as saying “The impact of high food prices is particularly severe for the world’s 
poorest populations” and adds that without the EU’s assistance, the UN’s goal to reduce 
global poverty will fail. This European act of altruism, upon a second look, is not only 
a phantom one, but a Trojan Horse that is meant to purchase a highly needed strategic 
advantage for the EU in a growing global tide against EU and North American agri-
cultural subsidies and how they negatively impact on farmers in the Global South. The 
price Africa will pay for getting the “spare change” of one billion euro dropped in its 
begging bowl is that it will lose a strong standing in making a case against the EU for 
subsidizing its farmers so that they can unfairly compete with Africans in a global food 
market. What the EU’s charitable gesture does against the discourse of fair trade and 
the fundamental illogicality of preaching free trade in Africa while maintaining farm 
subsidies in Europe is far more significant that any apparent altruism it might suppose. 
Here then is the point about giving being an act of self-interest.
Impossibility of Gift
International development assistance, either through the agency of the state or the pri-
vate individual or corporation, has come to acquire the look of a gift to be given to the 
Global South by the Global North. Despite the attempts at pushing Freirean conceptions 
of participatory development and post-development advocacy of grassroots development 
to make this gift-giving paradigm effective (as in the discourse of aid effectiveness), 
it is still a challenge yet to be overcome. Part of this difficulty lies in the discourse of 
gift that founds the discourse of international development. From the Global North, the 
media focus is on the assistance being sent down. From the Global South, led by the 
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postcolonial state and the army of NGOs, the discourse is about how to attract develop-
ment assistance and make aid effective.
One is tempted to think that the push to “fix” aid to bring about development, as 
evident in the September 2008 Accra conference on Aid Effectiveness, is founded on 
a visceral need to assuage guilt feelings of historical wrongs to Africa rather than any 
critically examined conviction of the relationship between aid and development. And 
even then this reparative altruism is not an innocent one. Anyone who knows the story of 
European slavery and colonization of Africa cannot help but develop the compassion to 
help undo the wrongs of the past. And in such a position, a compassionate heart founded 
on the values of charity, philanthropy and assistance becomes inevitable. The task, I 
think, is to remind ourselves that it is not always the case that our do-good intensions 
translate into good outcomes. And the problem does not lie in how doing good is carried 
out. It lies precisely in the philosophical assumption that Africa must be helped. There is 
no co-relation between international development assistance flows and economic take-
off. One Ugandan journalist, Mwenda (2007), has already pointed out that the example 
of the Marshall Plan in post-War Europe used to justify the transfer of aid to Africa 
is an overstated case. American aid to Europe under the Marshall Plan accounted for 
about 3% of the GDP of the receiving European countries. The average African country 
today receives about 15% of GDP as aid. And yet the success story of reconstruction 
in Europe is not replicated in Africa in its quest for modernization. William Easterly 
(2006) presents us with enough evidence to dispel our religious belief that aid is good 
for Africa’s economic growth and human development. He shows with hard statistical 
evidence that there is an inverse correlation between aid and development.
Since Marcel Mauss (1969), the literature on the sociology of gift has expressly 
demonstrated that the gifting relation is not an altruistic act. It is heavily loaded with 
debt. Indeed, despite its neoliberal undertones, an argument can always be made that 
the market is a superior form of exchange relations because market transactions result 
in a permanent liquidation of debt (Godbout 2000) between the parties. Gift-giving 
only results in the unresolved question of reciprocity, and for that matter, debt, or bet-
ter still, poison.
What then is the debt that African countries owe for being recipients of development 
assistance in this global divide of donors and beggars? The trouble with the gift as a 
means of exchange, according to Derrida, is its impossibility (Derrida 1992). The pos-
sibility of the gift is contingent on its relation of foreignness to the economy. As a result, 
the possibility of the gift requires the absence of reciprocity, exchange, counter-gift, or 
debt. If the gift is reciprocated, it cancels out the gift as gift. The gift is thereby annulled 
if any restitution for the gift is ever given. The gift must not only remain unpaid, but 
cannot even be recognized as a gift by either the donor or recipient. Acknowledgment of 
the gift gives rise to gratuity, self-recognition, and other symbolic forms of reciprocity. 
Therefore, if the gift is recognized as such, the gift is annulled, and if there is no gift, 
then there is no gift. The possibility of the gift is its impossibility.
Derrida points out that the relationship among time, the economy, and the gift is an 
important one that we should attend to. In time, all gifts are reciprocated and, there-
fore, part of the economy. Not only does the impossibility of the gift highlight that the 
gift is, in fact, always a part of the economy (through the logic of exchange), but that 
the gift finds its legitimation in its defiance to the economy; a defiance that, according 
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to Derrida, does not in fact exist. According to Derrida, there is no “logic of the gift” 
because the discourse of the gift is always speaking of something other than the gift 
itself. Unlike Derrida, Pierre Bourdieu (1996; and 1990) argues for the possibility of 
gift through time. The time lapse between the inaugural gift and the counter-gift allows 
for a collective delusion of the possibility of the gift. But more significantly, Boudieu 
points out the role of the gift in the perpetuation of what he calls “symbolic violence”. 
And this symbolic violence is more severe when the counter-gift is practically impos-
sible as is the case in charity, which ultimately leads to a lasting relation of dependency 
and enslavement of debt.
Here then is the power of Truman’s re-articulation of international soft power as in-
ternational development assistance. It also illustrates the burden of debt resulting from 
gifting that the African farmer and his continent owe the EU for the one billion euro 
of aid. The cost of this aid as a Trojan horse is never discussed in the mass media. The 
gift will always facilitate the speaking of something other than itself. And it is in that 
something that we may find the true cost of international aid. Not in the feel-good sto-
ries of building a clinic for the village through donations – stories my graduate students 
love to bring to my class. It is precisely these forms of symbolic violence inherent in 
the gift that post-development scholars see as the driving force behind the post-WWII 
development project.
From the Gift of Spiritual Salvation  
to the Gift of Economic Emancipation
Looking back at the 19th century European missionary work abroad helps us understand 
its contemporary parallels with the international development aid industry in its quest 
for the economic emancipation of Africa through assistance. Both the missionary work 
of the 19th century and the institutional practice of 21st century international develop-
ment assistance today have some very eerie similarities. Imagine a Canadian NGO 
that sources funding from CIDA to promote human rights education among African 
journalists. To qualify as an expert and be sent to Nigeria, one must be under 30 years 
of age and a Canadian citizen. One of my graduate students was sent on this project for 
one year after completing a bachelor’s degree in the social sciences. She was sent to 
Nigeria to conduct workshops on sensitizing Nigerian journalists to human rights issues. 
She arrived in Nigeria only to discover that a good number of those attending had been 
working as journalists before she was born. Some had risked their lives under military 
governments to demand freedom of speech. A good number also had graduate degrees. 
Yet, this young missionary of human rights was given the task of teaching Africans the 
gospel of human rights. What facilitates this absurdity is the reality of the global divide 
of donors and beggars.
When she told me her experience as an NGO staff facilitator of human rights educa-
tion in Nigeria, she reminded me of the qualifications required to be allowed to work 
as a missionary in Africa two centuries earlier. In 1876, the Ladies Committee of the 
London Missionary Society rejected the application of a woman “with native blood in 
her” from modern day Mumbai (formally Bombay), who thought she had all the skills 
to work in Africa. She was told it was official policy to recruit “only English ladies with 
thorough English education” (Thorne 1999: 108). While race was used as the measure 
of qualification, citizenship is used today as the measure of qualification to work in the 
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secular missionary work of international development. If race was used in 19th century 
missionary work as the structural mechanism for ensuring that international development 
assistance functioned properly as a means to ameliorate domestic conditions in Europe, 
citizenship is the new structural mechanism to ensure that international development as-
sistance functions properly as a means of creating “jobs for the boys” – perhaps an even 
more sanitized version of good old pork-barrel politics. In both processes, the compas-
sionate language of philanthropy and charity has been mobilized to mask them.
I have a second example. In the business of international development assistance, we 
do know that the World Bank was instrumental in articulating private sector participa-
tion in international development. Today it is a very expanding industry. Indeed the 
feel-good stories of helping the Global South grow out of its dehumanizing poverty trap 
have achieved new levels of appreciation with the coinage of a new lexical monstrosity – 
“philanthropreneurs” – to designate the reinvention of the relationship between capitalism 
and development (Strom 2006). Bill Gates quits his daytime job to become a full-time 
charity worker; Pierre Omidyar, founder of eBay, wants to use investment capital and 
donations to expand micro credit programs. The list can continue. Alan Abramson, head 
of the non-profit and philanthropy program at the Aspen Institute, puts is quotably: 
These guys have firsthand knowledge of the market’s power, and they’re asking 
themselves why they can’t make money and tackle some of the problems once 
addressed primarily by government at the same time (quoted in Strom 2006).
This is a repeat of history with a twist. If the state and multilateral institutions are in-
strumental in inviting the private sector into the lucrative business of development in 
the 21st century, in the 19th century it was the missionaries who invited Empire into the 
edifying business of the civilizing mission. 
As Susan Thorne shows in her re-reading of colonial historiography, it was when the 
distant focus of missionary activities increasingly came under attack at home that the 
London Missionary Society strategically introduced the discourse of social imperialism 
and the need for Empire to actually come on board to facilitate the civilizing mission 
abroad (Thorne 1999). We know that one of the reasons for the World Bank’s appeal to 
the private sector to come on board international development assistance is the supposed 
dwindling of resources for the non-profit sector. And here again, if we compare the 
strategies for raising funds both then (in the 19th century) and now (for instance World 
Vision’s infomercial on TV and “telethons”), the imperial and colonial logic becomes 
even more poignant (Jefferess 2002). For instance, in an attempt to widen the social base 
of its collections, the LMS introduced a penny-a-week guild in 1903. By 1916, there 
were penny-a-week clubs among the working classes (Thorne 1999: 114). We know the 
consequences of the missionary work in Africa and how it facilitated colonialism. Given 
the similarity of missionary work in Africa then and now, what are the consequences of 
international development assistance today? 
The Cost of International Development Assistance
There has been a wealth of NGO literature in recent years that shows how international 
development assistance is a phantom one (Action Aid 2005 and 2006; Christian Aid 
2005). The empty promises from G8 summits are not new. What is not often articulated 
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is the real cost of aid. My argument is that if missionary work in the past facilitated the 
actual colonization of land, the missionary work of today (international development 
work) is facilitating the actual colonization of the postcolonial state. One only needs to 
look at the “Letters of Intent” submitted by African governments to the IMF every six 
months to see how the external aid industry underwrites new modes of state account-
ability, which I can only describe as tutelary governance. Letters of Intent are periodic 
reports that governments under structural adjustment submit to the IMF to explain how 
they are governing their country and how they are disbursing development assistance. 
They must also explain why they have not fulfilled IMF and World Bank expectations, 
should there be any failings. These letters are often signed by the African country’s 
Minister of Finance, and depending on how trusted the government is, counter-signed 
by the governor of the Central Bank. If you have a state that depends on external sources 
to balance its budget, why will it be accountable to the citizens at home that it governs? 
What aid does is to prevent African governments from engaging in production relations 
with their citizens and local businesses. 
Andrew Mwenda (2007) presents some startling statistics on Uganda to alarm us. In 
the 2006/07 national budget of Uganda, the Government’s projections were:
Expected Revenue:    2.5 trillion Shillings
Expected Foreign Aid   1.9 trillion Shillings
Recurrent Expenditure   2.6 trillion Shillings
Development Expenditure  1.8 trillion Shillings
Recurrent Expenditure is the cost of administration of the country, which includes some 
70 ministers, 114 presidential advisors and 333 members of parliament, among others. 
At the Ministry of Health headquarters, the government provided 3000 FWDs, yet none 
of the 961 counties has an ambulance at their clinics. 
Ghana is another illustrative example. Shortly after celebrating debt relief under the 
World Bank’s Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC), Ghana turned around 
and spent 60 million US dollars to celebrate its 50th anniversary as an independent nation 
(Daily Graphic 2009). The Ghanaian Government then commissioned a 176 million US 
dollar presidential mansion to be built and subsequently signed a 37 million US dollar 
cheque to order a presidential jet (National Enquirer 2009). All these expenditure were 
heavily criticized by members of civil society, yet the state refused to budge. According 
to the National Enquirer (2009) newspaper, the president “attracted a lot of criticism 
from minority parties and sections of the Ghanaian public, when commissioning the 
project, for not seeing to the priority needs of the people, such as addressing the acute 
water shortage and lack of capacity to deal with sanitation in the cities, and described 
the choice as amounting to a misplaced priority.” The Ghanaian state refused to budge 
because it expects volunteers and donors from rich countries to come and build the 
schools and clinics that are badly needed in many parts of the country. This is a country 
where a donation of furniture or books at a cost of USD 5,000 to a community school 
makes headline news.
The vulgarity of the postcolonial state, which founds its legitimacy in the articulation 
of national development, yet does otherwise, can be seen in the table below. At the end 
of 2008, when Ghanaians elected a new government, parliament approved a package 
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of ex-gratia award for the retiring president. When the details of the law were made 
public in January 2009, Ghanaians described it as unacceptably extravagant. While it 
remains to be seen if the new government will repeal that law and revise the package, I 
have compared the benefits of Ghana’s retiring President, John Kufuor, with that of his 
American counterpart, George Bush Jr., as both left office in the same month and year 
after eight years of service.
Table 1. Comparing Retirement Packages for Ghanaian and American Presidents2 
Pension
 
No. Of cars
 
Official residence
End of service gratuity
Support for Widow
Medical and dental
Entertainment
 
Foreign Travel
 
Foundation/Presidential 
Library
USD 191,000.00 taxable
No car
 
No house
No End of service gratuity
Lifetime pension of 
USD20,000.00
Free family coverage
Not provided for
 
Paid for by the state with 2 
supporting staff
 
Private funds (tax exempt) for 
presidential Library
400,000.00 non-taxable lump 
sum
6 fully maintained, compre-
hensively insured fleet to be 
renewed every 4 years
Two fully furnished houses
1.2 million USD
Retains ownership of houses. 
No pension
Free family coverage
Unspecified but to be provided 
for by Office of State Protocol
Paid for by the state with 3 
supporting staff. Can travel for 
up to 60 days in a year
State provides One Million 
USD seed money to help start 
a private foundation
 Ghana United States of America 
 (per capita income (per capital income 
Retirement Benefits USD 1,400) USD 46,000
What makes the Ghanaian postcolonial state act so lavishly for itself and not for devel-
opment projects? How is it possible that Ghana can contemplate such a package for its 
ex-president – one that surpasses that the package provided by the United States? This 
is possible because much of the Ghanaian national budget is underwritten by external 
donor support in the form of development assistance, while the state has no incentive 
to be accountable to the needs of civil society. In such a disjuncture, the postcolonial 
state becomes a good instrument for external control as part of its payment for the debt 
of the gift of development assistance. 
This postcolonial state’s loyalty and fealty to external agencies is well illustrated 
by the story of Ghanaian farmers and their battle against unfair competition. Imported 
chicken and rice are cheaper in Ghana than are locally produced products. So poultry 
producers were able to convince the Ministry of Finance to impose special levies on im-
ported chicken products to give local produce an edge in the competition. When this was 
incorporated into the national budget for 2003 and passed in parliament, the government 
revenue collection agency at the nation’s ports refused to enforce it. The consequence 
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of this rare situation of government refusing to collect legitimate tariffs was that it was 
losing revenue, deliberately, while local farmers continued to be disadvantaged in an 
unfair competition with imported and subsidized products from Europe. Next, the local 
poultry producers took the government to court to legally compel it to implement the 
tariffs on imported chicken and rice. When it won judgment in 2005, the President sent 
his Finance Minister to parliament to read a bill under “a rarely-used emergency meas-
ures” (Christian Aid 2005: 31) to overturn the 2003 act that compelled government to 
collect tariffs on imported chicken and rice, and ultimately, to make the court decision 
irrelevant. What the local poultry farmers did not know was that Ghana had committed 
in a previous “Letter of Intent” to the IMF and World Bank promising that it would not 
impose tariffs on goods like imported chicken and rice. In addition, in a previous 2000 
agreement with the IMF, Ghana had committed not to impose tariffs on agricultural 
inputs and in return get a 35.1 million USD loan from the Fund to support its Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility (IMF 2000). According to a Christian Aid report, both 
the IMF and the World Bank used their top most officials, including the then president 
of the Bank, James Wolfensohn, to personally put pressure on the Ghanaian president 
and his senior ministers to repeal the law requiring the state to collect import duties on 
imported agricultural goods (Christian Aid 2005).
Torn between civil society and the donor institutions led by the IMF and the World 
Bank, the government demonstrated accountability to the latter institutions by acting 
unilaterally against the very economic interest of Ghanaian businesses. Under WTO 
rules, Ghana can levy tariffs on imported agricultural products. But the Ghanaian state 
will have none of that. Even if local businesses organized to defend their interest against 
international competitors using legitimate means, like lobbying to have the national 
budget statement reflect their needs and going to court to get a judgment, the state, in 
an afterthought, demonstrated its loyalty to external donors. This is the true cost of 
international development assistance. Local entrepreneurs and labour in Ghana do not 
stand any chance of competing against imported chicken from Europe, because European 
farmers enjoy state subsidies on grains use as feeds. The IMF and World Bank were 
instrumental in pressurizing Ghana to remove subsidies to farmers under its structural 
adjustment program. Now they have to unfairly compete with European farmers in their 
own domestic market. And the Ghanaian democratically elected government is supervis-
ing this unfair treatment of its farmers by actively working to perpetuate it.
Andrew Mwenda (2007) Ugandan Journalist, puts it aptly:
If the government’s fiscal survival depends on it having to raise money from its 
own people, such a government is driven by self interest to govern in a more en-
lightened fashion. It will sit with those who create wealth, talk to them about the 
kind of policies and institutions that are necessary for them to expand the scale 
and scope of business so that it can collect more tax revenue from them. The 
problem with the African continent and the problem with the aid industry is that 
it has distorted the structure of incentives facing governments in Africa.
The state has literally become an institution-for-itself and in that dispensation, it be-
comes available to external interest rather than local demands as part of the payment 
for the debt of the gift of aid. External agencies have leveraged the power of giving into 
appropriating the instrumentality of the state. This is an effect of the gift, which Der-
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rida says does everything, except what it promises. Donor support has resulted in the 
transformation of the postcolonial state into an instrument of tutelary governance. It is 
from this perspective that I think development communication theorists can inquire into 
the discursive functions of donor support in international development.
Conclusion
I want to conclude with a reference to African writer Aminata Sow Fall’s novel the Beg-
gars’ Strike. I read that novel as an allegory of the African condition of aid dependence. 
As an allegory, it tells us how we can end this global divide of benefactors and benefici-
aries, or philanthropists and recipients of aid. The Beggars’ Strike is a remarkable story 
of street panhandlers, despised as the jetsam and flotsam of Senegalese society, who 
could not take the abuse and physical assault from city officials who wanted to clear them 
from the street corners. The difficult circumstance of one of them being killed in an act 
of terror against the beggars produced its hero in the person of Nguirane, who philoso-
phized, and rightly so, that alms giving and alms collecting are relations of exchange 
that mutually benefit both parties. So the city officials are mistaken in assuming that only 
beggars benefit from alms-giving. I wish to quote the character Nguirane here: 
Our Hunger doesn’t worry them. They need to give in order to survive, and if we 
didn’t exist, who would they give to? How could they ensure their own peace of 
mind? They don’t give for our sake; they give for their own sake! They need us 
so they can live in peace (Fall 1981: 38)
So when the beggars decided to move out of the city to live at a distant fringe, alms 
givers started travelling the long distance just to give alms. In the end, the city officials 
wanted them back at the street corners, but the beggars declined. This discovery of the 
power relations between alms givers and beggars reminds us of the specular economy 
that masquerades as philanthropy. And this is what development communication theory 
needs to open up. 
Notes
 1. Real name omitted for confidentiality.
 2. Table constructed from three sources: Danso (2009); Reuters Report (2009) and Smith (2008).
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